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Splintered Decisions, Implicit Reversals 
and Lower Federal Courts: 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey' is ostensibly just another in 
a long line of abortion cases winding its way up to the Supreme 
Court. However, the Third Circuit's analysis of the issues in 
Casey provides an important illustration of some diff"1cult 
jurisprudential problems faced by lower federal courts when 
the Supreme Court has not clearly stated "what the law is."2 
The Constitution provides that "[tlhe judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in 
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and e~tablish."~ The judicial system which Congress has 
created pursuant to Article I11 requires inferior or lower federal 
courts to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court? 
When a lower federal court is presented with a case raising 
a question of law that the Supreme Court has previously 
decided, its role is limited to applying the Court's precedent to 
the facts of that case. However, the dual fundion of a Supreme 
Court decision-resolving particular cases and providing 
1. 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (US. Jan. 21, 
1992) (NO. 91-902). 
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Justice Marshall's 
statement, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is," id., was used to justify judicial review of legislative ads. 
However, it seems reasonable to suggest that implicit within the duty to "say what 
the law isw is the duty to do so clearly. The difficulty faced by the Casey court is 
that the latest Supreme Court abortion decisions have created a great deal of 
uncertainty about "what the law is." See infra text accompanying notes 26-37. 
3. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 9 1. 
4. "[Ulnless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a 
precedent of [the Supreme] Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no 
matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be." Hutto v. 
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982) (per curiam). "As a lower court, we are bound 
both by the Supreme Court's choice of legal standard or test and by the result it 
reaches under that standard or test." Casey, 947 F.2d at 691-92. 
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guidance for fbture decisions5-complicates the task of 
determining the precedential value of a particular decision 
when: (1) the majority does not agree on a single supporting 
rationale for its decision-a splintered decision; or (2) the 
majority's rationale for a particular result undermines the 
rationale supporting the result of a previous case without 
explicitly overturning it-an implicit reversal. These 
complications are especially significant in light of expectations 
that the Supreme Court's new ideological make-up will create a 
period of transition, as the Court reshapes many areas of the 
law in a more conservative image? 
Casey is an example of how lower federal courts might 
untangle a limited number of these complications. In Casey, the 
Third Circuit upheld the constitutionality of various sections of 
Pennsylvania's abortion statute, reasoning that Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services,' a splintered decision, implicitly 
overturned parts of Roe v. Wade.' 
To lay the necessary groundwork for a discussion of Casey's 
implications, this note briefly reviews relevant portions of the 
Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence and outlines the Third 
Circuit's reasoning in Casey. The note then analyzes the Third 
5.  Linda Novak, Note, m e  Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 756, 757 (1980) (lower federal courts are bound by 
both the result and the rationale of a Supreme Court decision). 
6. Compare Marshall Ingwerson, High Court's Slide to the Right, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4, 1991, 5 U.S. at 6 ("The overall drift of the court, to most 
court-watchers, is at the least to consolidate the sharp rightward shift that began 
at the end of the Reagan presidency.") and Michael P. Ostrye, New Anthem, LA. 
TIMES, July 29, 1991, at B4 ("With the Supreme Court on a new shift to the 
conservative right, maybe we should change the national anthem to 'Under My 
Thumb.' ") with Robert P. Hey, US Supreme Court Opens Term, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MoN~~oR, Oct. 1, 1990, § U.S. at  1 ("Court-watchers are awaiting this year's 
judicial decisions to learn whether the court will continue its recent trend of 
making modest and generally more conservative changes in existing law."). 
In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), 
Justice Rehnquist dissented from the Court's broad interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause. He noted, "I do not think it incumbent on those of us in dissent to spell 
out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident, in time again 
command the support of a majority of this Court." Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). Justice O'Connor agreed: "I share Justice Rehnquist's belief that this 
Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility." Id. at 589 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Depending on your ideological preferences, these 
statements are like either a defiant General MacArthur declaring "I shall return," 
or a nightmarish Freddie Krueger warning "I'll be baaaaack." 
7. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
8. 410 US. 113 (1973). 
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Circuit's resolution of the dBcult questions concerning 
precedent. Finally, the note concludes that the Third Circuit's 
reasoning, though theoretically problematic, is jurisprudentially 
correct. 
11. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 
ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE 
In 1973, the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade held 
that articles of the Texas Penal Codeg criminalizing abortions 
not performed to save the mother's life, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 From a 
jurisprudential standpoint, the Court's opinion in Roe is 
important for three reasons. First, the Court held that a 
woman has a limited fimdamental right to an abortion which is 
protected by the right to privacy." Second, the opinion 
established that governmental regulation of abortion must be 
subjected to strict scrutiny12 to determine if it interferes 
unconstitutionally with a woman's abortion decision." Lastly, 
Roe developed a trimester framework to provide future 
guidance in determining the point at  which a state's legitimate 
interests in maternal health and fetal life become compelling." 
9. The regulations at issue in Roe included articles 1191-94 and 1196 of the 
Texas Penal Code. Id. at 117. For the text of the relevant articles see id. at 117 
n.1. 
10. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 8 1; Roe, 410 US. at 164. 
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at  153. "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any 
right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however . . . the Court has recognized that 
a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, 
does exist under the Constitution." Id. at 152. This right to privacy extends only to 
those rights which are considered fundamental. Id. Although the Court determined 
that the right to  an abortion is fundamental and thus protected by the right to 
privacy, it rejected the argument that it was absolute. Id. at 153. 
12. Strict scrutiny is the Supreme Court's highest standard of review. See, e.g., 
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2952 (1990) warshall, J., joined by 
Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("me have subjected state laws limiting 
[the abortion] right to the most exacting scrutiny . . . ."). Strict scrutiny requires 
that a regulation pass the following two-part test: (1) the regulation must be 
prompted by a compelling state interest; and (2) the regulation must be the least 
restrictive means of promoting the compelling state interest. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 
155. 
13. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
14. Id. at 162-65. The state's interest in the health of the mother becomes 
compelling at the end of the first trimester, when the health risk of an abortion 
becomes equal to that of a normal childbirth. Id at 163. The state's interest in 
protecting potential life becomes compelling at the point of viability, approximately 
the end of the second trimester, when the fetus is capable of meaningful life 
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Since Roe, several Supreme Court cases have invoked strict 
scrutiny in reviewing state abortion regulations. Two decisions 
are relevant to the present discussion: Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health (Akron I)'' and Thornburgh v. 
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists. l6 
In Akron I, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe's 
determination that any regulation of abortion must be 
"reasonably designed"" to further a compelling interest," 
striking down an Akron ordinance requiring a woman's 
"informed written consent" prior to performance of an 
abortion.'' The Court conceded that an informed consent 
requirement could be valid in light of the state's interest in 
protecting the health of pregnant women2' but ruled that the 
Akron ordinance's requirements for securing informed consent 
went beyond the scope of the health interestO2l In Thornburgh, 
outside the mother's womb. Id. 
15. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
16. 476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
17. Akron I, 462 US. at 434. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, used the 
phrase "reasonably designed to further that state interest" to describe part two of 
the strict scrutiny test. "Reasonably designed" is linguistically similar to 
"reasonably related," the terminology used in part two of the rational basis 
scrutiny test. See infia note 30. However, the phrase is used in the context of 
reaffirming Roe's strict scrutiny requirement. This fact, together with the use of 
the word "designed" instead of the word "related," suggests that Justice Powell was 
contemplating that the regulation must be subjected to strict scrutiny. Contra infra 
note 33. 
18. See Akmn I, 462 U.S. at 434. 
19. AKRON CODIFIED ORDINANCES $ 1870.06 (1978) specifed certain information 
to be provided prior to obtaiaing a written consent for an abortion. For the text of 
the ordinance, see Akron I, 462 U.S. at 423-24 n. 5. The Court in Akron I also 
struck down other abortion related regulations that are not relevant to this 
discussion. See id. at 452. 
20. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 443. The Supreme Court first recognized the 
legitimacy of informed consent in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65- 
66 (1976). 
21. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 443-44. In other words, Akron's ordinance failed the 
second prong of strict scrutiny review. In Thornburgh, Justice Blackrnun explained 
why the Akron I informed consent ordinance was overbroad: 
The informational requirements in the Akmn ordinance were invalid 
for two "equally decisive" reasons. The first was that "much of the 
information required is designed not to inform the woman's consent but 
rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether." The second was that a 
rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases, 
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes upon the 
discretion of the pregnant woman's physician and thereby imposes the 
"undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket" with which the Court in 
Danforth was concerned. 
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the Supreme Court reaf!firmed the principles laid down in 
~ o e "  and applied the rationale developed in Akron 1% to 
strike down a Pennsylvania informed consent statute? Both 
Akron I and Thornburgh are significant because the informed 
consent provisions which these decisions struck down are 
almost identical to those at issue in C ~ s e y . ~ ~  
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services26 signaled a 
substantial departure from Roe and its progeny. For the first 
time a majority of the Court did not invoke strict scrutiny to 
review the challenged regulations. In Webster, Missouri 
statutes requiring viability t e s t i g  and prohibiting the use of 
public funds, employees, or facilities to perform2' or counsel2' 
about abortions were upheld, applying ostensibly rational basis 
scrutiny.30 A combination of three opinions supported the 
Court's result in Webster. Writing for the plurality, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist found the regulations constitutional because 
they permissibly furthered the state's interests?' Justice 
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted). 
22. "Again today, we reaffirm the general principles laid down in Roe and in 
Akron." Thonburgh, 476 U.S. at 747. 
23. Id. at 762. "These two reasons [see supra note 211 apply with equal and 
controlling force to the specific and intrusive informational prescriptions of the 
Pennsylvania statutes." Id. 
24. Id. at 759-64 (invalidating 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 8 3205 (1983)). 
25. P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 697 (3d Cir. 1991). Compare 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. 8 3205 (1983) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Q 3205 
(Supp. 1991). 
26. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
27. Mo. ANN. STAT. 3 188.029 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Webster, 492 U.S. a t  
513-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.); id. at  525-31 (O'Connor, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at  532 (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
28. MO. ANN. STAT. $8 188.210, 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see Webster, 492 
U.S. a t  507-11 (opinion of the Court). 
29. Mo. ANN. STAT. $8 188.205, 188.210 & 188.215 (Vernon Supp. 1992); see 
Webster, 492 U.S. at 511-13 (opinion of the Court). 
30. Rational basis scrutiny is the Supreme Court's least restrictive standard of 
review. See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. a t  543 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Rational 
basis scrutiny requires that (1) the state have a legitimate interest; and (2) the 
regulation must be reasonably related to the legitimate state interest. Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Williamson v. Lee 
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). 
31. Webster, 492 U.S. at  519-20 (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by White & Kennedy, 
JJ.) Justice Rehnquist's language noting that the statute permissibly furthers a 
legitimate state interest is equated with rational basis scrutiny. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 689 (3d Cir. 1991). Previously, Justice 
Rehnquist has advocated rational basis scrutiny in this area. See, e.g., Roe v, 
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, Scalia concurred in the result but advocated the outright 
reversal of Roe.32 Justice O'Comor also concurred in the 
result but analyzed the regulations using an "undue burden" 
standard of review.33 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) ("The test traditionally applied in the area of 
social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged 
has a rational relation to a valid state objective."). 
32. Webster, 492 US. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). Justice Scalia does not articulate his standard of review. Instead, 
he notes that it has been adequately articulated "in dissents of my colleagues in 
other cases." Id. Many of these dissents generally advocate rational basis review. 
See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). 
33. Webster, 492 U.S. at 530 (O'Co~or, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgement). According to the Casey murt, Justice 07Connor's formulation of the 
undue burden standard requires strict scrutiny if a regulation places an undue 
burden on the abortion decision. Casey, 947 F.2d at 713 ("[We hold that 5 3209 
[spousal notice] constitutes an undue burden on a woman's abortion decision. 
Accordingly we must apply strict scn~tiny . . . ."). If there is no undue burden, the 
regulation is subject only to rational basis review. Id. at 689-90. 
Although the Casey Court correctly identified Justice O'Connor's undue burden 
standard as the narrowest concurrence, see infra part IV.A.4, the court incorrectly 
interpreted one-half of the standard. Justice O'Connor does not define the undue 
burden standard in either Webster or Hodgson. Reference to her earlier dissents in 
Akron I and Thornburgh is necessary to discover its meaning. In Akron I, Justice 
O'Connor states that "[tlhe 'undue burden' required in the abortion cases 
represents the required threshold inquiry that must be conducted before this Court 
can require a State to justify its legislative actions under the exacting 'compelling 
state interest' standard." Akron I, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983). According to Justice 
O'Co~or, a regulation is considered unduly burdensome if it imposes "absolute 
obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision." Id. at 464. (07Connor, J., 
joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Later in her opinion, Justice 
O'Connor explains what she means by an "exacting" standard. 
The Court has never required that state regulation that burdens the 
abortion decision be "narrowly drawn" to express only the relevant state 
interest. In Roe . . . the Court never actually adopted this standard . . . . 
In its decision today, the Court fully endorses the Roe requirement that a 
burdensome health regulation, or . . . "significant obstacle[]" be 
"reasonably related" to the state compelling interest. 
Id. at 467-68 n. 11 (citation omitted, emphasis added). Two things are clear from 
this statement. First, Justice O'Connor's interpretation of Roe does not require 
strict scrutiny. Second, Justice O'Connor's "exacting" standard of review requires 1) 
a compelling state interest; and 2) a regulation that is reasonably related to that 
interest. This is the traditional formulation of exacting or mid-tier scrutiny. 
With this in mind, the following is the correct formulation of the undue burden 
sttmdard. If a regulation places an undue burden on the abortion decision, the 
Court applies exacting or mid-tier scrutiny. If a regulation does not impose an 
undue burden, the Court applies rational basis scmtiny. Justice O'Co~or's dissent 
in Thonbu?gh confirms this conclusion. 
I do, however, remain of the views expressed in my dissent in Akron 
. . . . [Hleightened scrutiny [should be] reserved for instances in which 
the State has imposed an "undue burden" on the abortion decision. . . . 
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In Hodgson v. Minnesota," the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of an abortion statute imposing a mandatory 
48-hour waiting period and a parental notification requirement 
on minors. The statute also provided for judicial bypass of the 
parental notification req~ i rement .~~  Again the decision of the 
Court was not supported by any single rationale. Justice 
Kennedy determined that parental notification coupled with a 
judicial bypass was constitutionally permi~sible.~~ Justice 
O'Connor determined that two-parent notification coupled with 
a judicial bypass did not unduly burden the abortion right and 
was therefore ~onstitutional.~~ 
111. THIRD CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE BINDING 
NATURE OF SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
A. Procedural History of Casey 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey3' was a facial challenge by a 
group of health care providers to the constitutionality of several 
amendments to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 
1982.39 After a three day trial, the district court issued an 
And if a state law does interfere with the abortion decision to an extent 
that is unduly burdensome, so that it becomes "necessary to  apply an 
exacting standard of review," the possibility remains that the statute will 
withstand the strider scrutiny. 
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 
828 (1986) (O'Comor, J., joined by White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (citations 
omitted). 
34. 110 S. Ct 2926 (1990). 
35. Id. at 2947. 
36. Although Justice Kennedy's opinion does not explicitly state the standard of 
review employed, a careful reading of the opinion suggests his analysis is based on 
a rational basis review of the regulations. See Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2961-72 
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ., White and Scalia, JJ., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part). The Casq, court reached a similar 
conclusion. Casey, 947 F.2d at 696. 
37. Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2950-51 (O'Co~or, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment in part). According to Justice O'Co~or's articulation of 
undue burden review in Akron I, a finding that a regulation does not unduly 
burden the abortion right requires the application of rational basis scrutiny to 
determine whether the regulation is constitutional. See supra note 33. 
38. 744 F. Supp. 1323 (ED. Pa. 1990) rev'd in part, affd in part, 947 F.2d 682 
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1992) (No. 91-902). 
39. Act of March 25, 1988, No. 31, 55 3-10, 1988 Pa. Laws 262 and Act of Nov. 
17, 1989, No. 64, 99 1-9, 1989 Pa. Laws 592 (amending 18 PA. CONS. *AT. ANN. 
93 3201-20 (1983)). The State of Pe~sylvania  passed the 1988 amendments prior 
to the Supreme Court's ruling in Webster. Casey, 744 F. Supp at 1325. After issu- 
ing a preliminary injunction, the district court stayed further proceedings pending 
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opinion holding several sections of the act, including an in- 
formed consent requirement, unconstitutional. On appeal, the 
Third Circuit reversed, upholding the constitutionality of the 
informed consent requirement:' 
B. The Third Circuit's Reasoning in Casey. 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that, like 
Webster, the abortion statutes in question did not conflict with 
the holding of Roe because they "involved the regulation of 
abortions rather than their outright pr~hibition.'~' The court 
then addressed "whether the standard of review of abortion 
regulations promulgated by the Court in Roe and in later cases 
such as [Akron I and Thornburgh] survived Webster and the 
Court's subsequent decision in [Hoclgson] ."42 
The court recognized three standards used by different 
Justices in reviewing abortion de~isions.'~ But because the re- 
sults in Webster and Hodgson were not supported by majori- 
ties," the court turned to Marks v. United  state^:^ relying 
on it for two important propositions: ( 1 )  "a legal standard en- 
dorsed by the Court ceases to be the law of the land when a 
majority of the Court in a subsequent case declines to apply it, 
even if that majority is composed of Justices who disagree on 
what the proper standard should be;"46 and (2) "the controlling 
opinion in a splintered decision is that of the Justice or Jus- 
the outcome of Webster. Id. After the Court's ruling in Webster, the Pennsylvania 
legislature passed the 1989 amendments and appellees amended their complaint to 
include these amendments. Id. 
40. The Pennsylvania informed consent provision requires the "voluntary and 
informed consent of the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed." PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. 5 3205 (Supp. 1991). Sections 3206 (parental consent), 3214(a) 
(reporting requirements), and 320703) and 32140 (public disclosure of clinic's 
reports) were also found constitutional. Casey, 947 F.2d at 687. Section 3209 
(spousal notice) was declared unconstitutional. Id. 
41. Casey, 947 F.2d at 687; see also Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 
(E.D. La. 1991) (invalidating a criminal prohibition of abortion similar to the Texas 
prohibition invalidated in Roe); supra text accompanying note 10. 
42. +ey, 947 F.2d at  687-88 (citations omitted). 
43. Id. at 688-91. The three standards of review according to Casey are: (1) 
strict scrutiny, id. at 689; see generally supra note 12; (2)  rational basis scrutiny, 
Casey, 947 F.2d at  689; see generally supra note 30; and (3) undue burden review, 
Casey, 947 F.2d at  689-91; see genenzlly supra note 33. 
44. See supra text accompanying notes 31-33, 36-37. 
45. 430 US. 188 (1977). For a brief summary of Marks see infia notes 60-63 
and accompanying text. 
46. Casey, 947 F.2d at 693. 
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tices who concur on the 'narrowest  ground^."^' Applying the 
Marks analysis, the court found that a majority of the Justices 
had not applied Roe's strict scrutiny test in Webster or 
Hodgson. The court also determined that Justice 0%onnor7s 
opinion was the opinion concurring in the result on the narrow- 
est groundd8 Accordingly, the court determined that the un- 
due burden analysis had replaced Roe's strid scrutiny analysis 
as the proper test for reviewing abortion regulations." 
Having decided that Roe's strict scrutiny did not survive 
Webster and Hodgson, the second issue the court addressed was 
whether it was "required to follow results reached by the Su- 
preme Court in cases prior to  Webster and Hodgson even 
though [it was] not bound by the rationale which produced 
those results[.]"50 This concerned the court "because the Su- 
preme Court, engaging in strict scrutiny review in Akron I and 
Thornburgh, had struck down informed consent provisions al- 
most identical to the provisions at issue" in Casey? The court 
determined that the results of Akron I and Thornburgh were 
not binding, reasoning that when a "standard [of review] is 
replaced, decisions reached under the old standard are not 
binding."52 Applying undue burden analysis, the Third Circuit 
determined that Pennsylvania's informed consent requirements 
were con~titutional.~~ 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF MARKS 
According to the Third Circuit, Marks stands for two rele- 
vant propositions: (1) a legal standard ceases to be law when a 
majority of the court does not apply it;M and (2) the narrowest 
concurring opinion becomes the law when the court issues a 
splintered deci~ion.~' This section will analyze Casey's inter- 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 694-97. 
49. Id. at 697. The Eighth Circuit has similarly determined that Justice 
O'Connor's undue burden standard is  binding. Coe v. Melahn, No. 90-1552, slip op. 
at 3 (8th Cir. Mar. 2, 1992). 
50. Casey, 947 F.2d at 697. 
51. Id.; see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
52. Casey, 947 F.2d at 697-98 (footnote omitted). 
53. Id. at 702-04. The court ruled on the constitutionality of other provisions as 
well. See supra note 40. 
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
55. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
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pretation and application of these two propositions. 
A. Precedential Value of a Splintered Decision 
1. History of the narrowest grounds rule 
The history of the narrowest concurring opinion or nar- 
rowest grounds rule can be traced to Gregg v. Georgia.56 In 
this death penalty case, the Court interpreted F u r m n  v. Geor- 
g i ~ : ~  determining that "[slince five Justices wrote separately 
in  support of the judgments in Furman, the holding of the 
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members 
who concurred in  t he  judgments on the  narrowest 
grounds . . . ."58 Ironically, Gregg itself was a splintered deci- 
s i ~ n , ~ '  and thus a majority of the Court did not support the 
narrowest grounds rule. 
This defect was remedied in Marks v. United  state^.^' In  
Marks, a majority embraced the narrowest grounds rule6' to 
explain why the lower court erred in failing to follow the plu- 
56. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). Of 
the five Justices supporting the result in Furman, Justice B r e ~ a n  and Justice 
Marshall determined that capital punishment was unconstitutional per se, while 
Justice Douglas, Justice Stewart and Justice White determined that the Georgia 
statute was unconstitutional without reaching the issue of per se invalidity. The 
Gregg plurality concluded that Georgia's revised death penalty statute was consti- 
tutional because the defects noted by Justices Stewart and White were corrected 
when the statute was revised. Id. at 206-07; see generally Novak, supra note 5, at 
761. 
Interestingly, Justice White, the author of one of Furman's narrowest grounds 
opinions, did not join in the conclusion that the narrowest concurring opinion be- 
came the law. Instead he wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. 
59. Justice Stewart a~ounced  the judgment of the Court and gave an opinion 
joined by Justice Powell and Justice Stevens. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 158. Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist filed a separate statement concurring in the judg- 
ment. Id. at 226. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment joined 
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 207. Justice Blackmun filed 
a separate statement concurring in the judgment. Id. at 227. Justice B r e ~ a n  filed 
a dissenting opinion. Id. at 227. Justice Marshall also filed a dissenting opinion. 
Id. at 231. 
60. 430 US. 188 (1977). 
61. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, was joined by Chief Justice Burger, 
Justice White, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist. Interestingly, Justice 
Stewart and Justice Stevens, who both supported the narrowest grounds rule in 
Gregg, did not support it in Marks, while Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, 
Justice Blackmun, and Justice Rehnquist, who did not support the narrowest 
grounds rule in Gregg, supported the rule in Marks. 
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rality opinion in the Fanny Hill case,'j2 which adopted a new 
definition of obscenitys3 
Since Marks, the narrowest grounds rule has been men- 
tioned in three cases. In Vasquez u.  hiller^,^ a case affirming 
a lower court's ruling sustaining a petition for habeas corpus, 
the Court helped define the limitations of the narrowest 
grounds rule. In dissent, Justice Powell argued that the nar- 
rowest grounds rule applies to cases in which five Justices who 
support the rationale in a case are not the same five Justices 
that support the judgment or resuks5 This is an entirely differ- 
ent type of splintered decision than the ones described in Gregg 
and Marks. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,B6 cor- 
rectly noted that the narrowest grounds rule, as applied in 
Gregg and Marks, referred "only to the manner in which one 
may discern a single holding of the Court in cases in which no 
opinion on the issue in question has garnered the support of a 
maj oritY."' 
In City of Lakewood u. Plain Dealer Publishing Co.,B8 JUS- 
tice Breman, writing for a foudustice majority? referred to  
the narrowest grounds rule as the Court's "settled jurispru- 
dence."" Justice Brennan used the narrowest grounds rule to  
support his contention that the plurality opinion from Kouacs u. 
62. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attor- 
ney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
63. Marh, 430 U.S. at 192-93. 
64. 474 U.S. 254 (1986). 
65. See id. at  270 n.4 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ .  & Rehnquist, J. dis- 
senting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 11.15 (1976)). Justice Powell's 
argument was used to question the precedential value of Justice Blackrnun's opin- 
ion in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
66. Justice Meshall's opinion in Hillery was joined by Justice B r e ~ a n ,  Justice 
Blackmun, Justice Stevens, and in relevant part by Justice White. 
67. Hilley, 474 US. at 261-62 n.4. Justice Marshall makes it clear that the 
narrowest grounds rule does not apply to any part of an opinion which is support- 
ed by a majority of the Court. Id. 
68. 486 U.S. 750 (1988). 
69. Plain Dealer was decided by a 4-3 vote. Justice Brennan's opinion was 
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Scalia. Justice White 
wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justice Stevens and Justice 
O'Connor. Neither Chief Justice Rehnquist .nor Justice Kennedy took part in the 
decision of the case. 
70. Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at  765 n.9. Justice Breman's statement is interest- 
ing in light of the fact that he joined the dissent in two previous cases, Gregg and 
Marks, articulating the narrowest grounds rule. He did join Justice Marshall's 
opinion in Hillery. However, the Hillery majority did not rely on the narrowest 
grounds rule; it merely pointed to Justice Powell's misapplication of it. 
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Cooper7' was controlling precedent. 
Most recently, in Franklin u. Lyna~gh,?~ Justice Stevens, 
writing in dissent, used the narrowest grounds rule to give 
weight to Justice Burger's opinion in Lockett v. Ohio." He sta- 
ted that "[allthough only four Members of the Court joined the 
entire opinion. . . it has the same precedential value as a 
Court opinion because JUSTICE MARSHALL'S vote . . . rested on 
a broader ground than did the plurality'~."~~ Although Justice 
Stevens wrote in dissent, his application of the narrowest 
grounds rule illustrates the purpose it is intended to serve-to 
facilitate the interpretation of a majority judgment supported 
by different rationales. 
Although the narrowest grounds rule has appeared in the 
decisions of five Supreme Court cases, the rule can hardly be 
considered "settled j~risprudence."~~ In four of five cases ap- 
plying the narrowest grounds rule, its discussion has been 
relegated to footnotes.76 This, by itself, does not imply that the 
rule is invalid, but a careful review of the cases suggests that 
the narrowest grounds rule has been used as a tool to support 
a desired result in a limited number of cases, rather than an as 
established rule of case interpretati~n.~~ 
2. Justification for the narrowest grounds rule 
From the plurality opinion in Gregg to the dissent in 
Franklin, neither the Court nor any of the Justices has ever 
explained why the Court's holding in a splintered decision 
should be the "position taken by those Members who concurred 
in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."78 The proposition 
71. 336 US. 77 (1949). 
72. 487 U.S. 164 (1988). 
73. 438 US. 586 (1978). 
74. FrankZin, 487 U.S. at 191 n.1 (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, 
JJ., dissenting) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
75. But cf., Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. at 765 n.9. 
76. See supra notes 58, 63, 65, 67, 70 & 74. Marks is the only case discussing 
the narrowest grounds rule in the text of the decision. 
77. No Justice has consistently supported the narrowest grounds rule. See 
supm notes 59, 61, 65, 66, 69 & 74. Given that the validity of the narrowest 
grounds rule was not the issue before the Court in any of the five cases, the 
inconsistent support for the rule is not surprising. However, the fact remains that 
Marks is the only decision in which the rule has been used determinatively by a 
majority of the Court. The HiZZery majority did correctly interpret the narrowest 
grounds rule, but merely to  point out why it did not apply in that case. 
78. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 
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has been asserted without explanation. However, it is clear 
that two separate arguments favor the use of the narrowest 
grounds rule. The first, arising from the "case or controversy" 
req~irement,'~ is the policy disfavoring "the formulation of 
unnecessarily broad principles and encourag[ing] courts to  con- 
fine the scope of decisions to  those issues necessary for resolu- 
tion of the particular case."80 The second is the practical need 
for lower federal courts to be able t o  determine the meaning of 
a Supreme Court decision with some degree of clarity. Thus, 
the explanation goes, if a lower court applies the narrowest 
grounds rule, it will reach the result most likely to be upheld 
by a majority of the Supreme Court. 
3. Limitations on the narrowest grounds rule 
The narrowest grounds rule is a useful tool for deciphering 
the holding of the Court in the limited number of splintered 
decisions in which the plurality and concurring opinions have a 
"broader/narrower" relationship. However, the rule is not appli- 
cable t o  many splintered decisions.8' In many splintered deci- 
sions, the result is supported by rationales that are "different" 
as opposed to "broader/narrower." 
For example, in Arnett v. Kennedy," the Court held that a 
federal employee, subject to  removal only for cause, was not 
deprived of Fifth Amendment due process when not given a full 
evidentiary hearing prior to removal.83 The plurality deter- 
mined that Fifth Amendment due process concerns were not 
implicated because the employee's rights were conditioned by 
statutory removal procedures." In their concurring opinions, 
Justice Powell and Justice White disagreed with the plurality. 
They concluded that due process concerns were implicated but 
found that the statutory removal procedures did not violate the 
employee's due process rights.85 The dissent agreed with the 
(1979)). 
79. U.S. CONST. art 111, 5 2. 
80. Novak, supra note 5, at 762. 
81. Id. at 767. 
82. 416 US.  134 (1974) (analyzed in Novak, supra note 5, at 767-69). 
83. Id. at 163 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Stewart, J.); id. at 164 
(Powell, J. joined by Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 195-97 (White, J., concur- 
ring); see also Novak, supra note 5, at 767. 
84. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 163; see Novak, supra note 5, at 767. 
85. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 171, 195-96; see Novak, supra note 5, at 767-68. 
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concurrence that due process must be satisfied but determined 
that it was not satisfied in this case.86 
Obviously, the narrowest grounds rule is not dispositive in 
this type of case.87 The Court's result, no due process viola- 
tion, was supported by three Justices who said due process did 
not apply and three Justices who said due process was satis- 
fied. An additional complication is that the dissent must be 
taken into account in determining future cases of this nature 
because six Justices, those concurring and those dissenting, 
determined that due process concerns were re levad8 
4. Casey's application of the narrowest grounds rule to Web- 
ster 
According to the Third Circuit, the principal objective of 
the narrowest grounds rule "is to  promote predictability in the 
law by ensuring lower court adherence to Supreme Court pre- 
~edent."~' The court articulated its definition of the narrowest 
grounds rule as follows: "[wlhere a Justice or Justices concur- 
ring in the judgment in [a splintered decision] articulates a 
legal standard which, when applied, will necessarily produce 
results with which a majority of the Court from that case 
would agree, that standard is the law of the The 
86. Kennedy, 416 U.S. at 226-27; see Novak, supra note 5, at 768. 
87. For more examples of cases in which the narrowest grounds rule is not 
helpful, see Novak, supra note 5; see also Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Ma- 
jority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956). 
88. See generally Novak, supra note 5, at 768-69. 
89. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. 
granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1992) (No. 91-902). 
90. Id. The court explained its definition of the narrowest grounds rule as fol- 
lows: 
In a constitutional case where (1) there is a 5-4 decision or where there 
are only two opinions in the majority and (2) the majority votes to up- 
hold a law as constitutional, the "narrowest grounds" principle will iden- 
tify as authoritative the standard articulated by a Justice or Justices that 
would uphold the fewest laws as constitutional. Conversely, in a constitu- 
tional case where (1) there is a 5-4 split or there are only two opinions 
in the majority and (2) the majority strikes down a law as unconstitu- 
tional, the authoritative standard will be that which would invalidate the 
fewest laws as unconstitutional. 
Id. at 693-94 (emphasis added; "or" in the preceding passage was probably meant 
to be "and*). In a footnote the court continues its explanation: 
When six or more Justices join in the judgment and they issue three 
or more opinions, the situation is slightly more complex. In those cases, 
the idea is to locate the opinion of the Justice or Justices who concurred 
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Third Circuit then determined that because Justice 0'Connor7s 
opinions, applying an undue burden analysis, were the narrow- 
est of the concurring opinions in  both Webster and Hodgson, 
they were binding." 
a. Problems with Casey's application of the narrowest 
grounds rule. The application of the narrowest grounds rule in  
Casey creates several theoretical difficulties. 
1. Justice Scalia's criticism. According to Casey's formu- 
lation of the narrowest grounds rule, Justice Scalia's concurring 
opinion in Webster is arguably the broadest of the three concur- 
ring opinions. Thus, based on a broader/narrower relationship, 
Justice O'Connor's opinion, as the narrowest, would be included 
within the parameters of Justice Scalia's opinion. However, in  
his opinion, Justice Scalia criticizes Justice 0%onnor7s undue 
burden standard, noting that  he knows of "no basis for deter- 
mining that this particular burden (or any other for that  mat- 
ter) is 'due."B2 In light of this criticism, it is diflicult to sug- 
gest that Justice Scalia would consider Justice 0%onnor9s "nar- 
rower" opinion as fitting within the parameters of his own. To 
do so would require the reduction of each opinion to the stan- 
dard of review it purports to apply while disregarding the re- 
mainder of its analysis and commentary. 
2. One- Justice majorities. The most obvious theoretical 
difficulty with the narrowest grounds rule is that it allows a 
single Justice to declare the law, even if the other eight Justic- 
es di~agree. '~ Arguably, following the opinion of a single Jus- 
on the narrowest grounds necessary to secure a majoriQ. In other words, 
a lower court should not follow an opinion that, though part of the ma- 
jority in that case, was unnecessary to secure a five Justice majority. 
Thus, if three Justices issue the broadest opinion, two Justices concur on 
narrower grounds, and one Justice concurs on still-narrower grounds, the 
two-Justice opinion is binding because that was the narrowest of the 
opinions necessary to secure a majority. 
Id. at 694 n.7. Although the court states the function of the narrowest grounds 
rule is to  promote predictability in the law, id. at 693, its explanation of the nar- 
rowest grounds rule appears more supportive of the narrowness objective based on 
the case or controversy requirement. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77. In 
practice, however, both objectives are achieved. 
91. Casey, 947 F.2d at 697. Although the Casey court correctly applied the nar- 
rowest grounds rule to Webster and Hodgson, the court incorrectly applied Justice 
0'Connor7s undue burden standard. See supra note 33. 
92. Webster v. Reproductive Health Sews., 492 U.S. 490, 536 n.* (1989) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 
93. This fact was not lost to the Casey court. "We acknowledge[] that, 
'[allthough there is some awkwardness in attributing precedential value to an 
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tice for the sake of predictability in the law is counterproduc- 
tive in the long run for two reasons. First, a legal principle 
supported by a single Justice is not likely to endure very long, 
especially in highly controversial areas of the law such as abor- 
t i od4  Second, uncertainty in the law is increased by discour- 
aging the negotiation and compromise necessary to create a 
majority opinion while encouraging splintered decisions with 
each Justice expressing an individual view of the applicable 
legal principle.g5 
3. Narrowest grounds in light of the Court's statements. 
Another difficulty with Casey's use of the narrowest grounds 
rule is that every Justice in Webster, regardless of the standard 
of review he or she applied, noted that Roe is still the law of 
the land." To the extent that the Justices have expressly stat- 
ed that Roe is still the law, it appears problematic to formulate 
a rule under the narrowest grounds test which contradicts 
opinion of one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it is the 
usual practice when that is the determinative opinion.' " Casey, 947 F.2d at 694 
(quoting Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 981 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
94. This observation is highly relevant in this case. Since Webster and Hodgson, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall have retired from the Court and have been re- 
placed by Justices Souter and Thomas. With these changes, many observers feel 
that those Justices who advocated rational basis review of abortion regulations will 
attract a majority in Casey. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Legal Primer for Abortion's 
Future, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at F1; Nancy E. Roman, Thomas a Zost 
Cause' to Pro-choice, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at A4. This does not imply that 
Supreme Court precedent can be overturned by attrition. The force of precedent 
remains in tact regardless of the personnel changes on the Court. However, these 
changes do affect the way the Court will decide an issue in the future. 
95. Splintered decisions are not a new phenomenon. See generally John F. 
Davis & William L. Reynolds, Juridical Crippks: PluraliQ Opinions in the Supreme 
Court, 1974 DUKE LJ. 59; Novak supra note 5; Comment, supra note 87; . But 
from the standpoint of a lower federal court seeking to apply the Supreme Court's 
decisions, splintered decisions should not be encouraged. 
96. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (Rebnquist, CJ., joined by White & Kennedy, JJ.) 
("This case therefore affords us no occasion to revisit the holding of Roe . . . . To 
the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify and narrow Roe and succeed- 
ing cases.") id. at 525 (O'Comor, J.) ("[Tlhere is no necessity to . . . reexamine 
the constitutional validity of Roe v. Wade." (citation omitted)); id. at 537 (Scalia, J.) 
("Of the four courses we might have chosen today-to reaffirm Roe, to overrule it 
explicitly, to overrule it sub si2enti0, or to avoid the question-the last [the one 
chosen by the Court] is the least responsible."); id at 537 (Blackmun, J. joined by 
Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) ("Today, Roe v. W d ,  and the fundamental constitu- 
tional right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, survive but are 
not secure." (citation omitted)); see id. at 561 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (YTIhere is no need to modifv even slightly the holdings of 
prior cases in order to uphold 5 188.029."). 
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these statements. 
4. The implicit meaning of a splintered decision. The fmal 
difEculty with the narrowest grounds approach is that it im- 
putes to those Justices who concur on "broader" grounds an 
implicit approval of the reasoning of the narrowest concur- 
rence. The fact that Justices who support a result write sepa- 
rately to  express their reasoning suggests that they do not 
agree with the reasoning of the other concurring opinions. If 
the Justices who concur on "broader" grounds really did agree 
with the "narrower" concurrence, they would join it and save 
the effort of expressing a "different" view. This objection high- 
lights the fact that the narrowest grounds rule is not, in real- 
ity, a tool for discerning an actual constitutional doctrine. Rath- 
er, the rule is a tool which enables a lower federal court t o  
reach a result that will be upheld upon review by the Supreme 
Court. 
b. The practical advantage of the narrowest grounds rule. 
Despite the theoretical difficulties with the narrowest grounds 
rule, its application in Casey is justified &om a practical per- 
spective. The role of a lower federal court in constitutional 
adjudication is to decide each case based on guidance given by 
the Supreme Court. When the Court's guidance is unclear, the 
lower court must predict how the Supreme Court would decide 
the case. In Webster and Hodgson four Justices advocated ratio- 
nal basis scrutiny and four Justices advocated strict scrutiny. 
In both cases, the outcome of Justice O'Connor's undue burden 
analysis provided the swing vote for the majorities' result." 
Therefore, from a practical point of view, the Third Circuit was 
entirely correct in applying the undue burden analysis because 
it was dispositive in both Webster and Hodgson, notwith- 
standing the Justices' statements concerning the continuing 
validity of Roe?' 
B. Precedential Value of Old Results in 
Light of New Rationale 
The decisions of the Supreme Court are the law of the 
97. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text. 
98. See supra note 96. What appears to  have occurred in the recent abortion 
decisions is a bifurcation of the Court's abortion jurisprudence. Roe continues to 
control statutes which prohibit abortion, but not statutes which regulate abortion. 
See supra notes 10 & 41 and accompanying text. 
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land." To the extent they are applicable, they are binding on 
the lower courts until they have been reversed or  over- 
ruled.lM These principles, though generally accepted, do not 
end the inquiry when the continuing validity of a Supreme 
Court decision is in doubt. Before a lower federal court can 
apply the law as stated by the Supreme Court, it must f i s t  
determine what that law is.'" As previously noted, this is not 
always an easy task,lo2 especially considering the Supreme 
Court's habit of overruling its cases without an express state- 
ment.lo3 
1. Precedent may be overruled by implication 
The rationale or ratio decidendi of a later case may eviscer- 
ate the precedentid value of older authority as effectively as a 
statement expressly overturning it.'" Often "the overruling 
must be deduced from the principles of related cases."105 The 
Supreme Court noted over 100 years ago in Asher u. Texas106 
99. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
100. Rodriguez De Quijas v. ShearsodAmerican Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears 
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals 
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative 
of overruling its own decisions."); Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, 
Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535 (1983) (per curiam) ('[O]nly this Court may overrule one of 
its precedentsn); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text. Thus, the duty of a 
lower federal court is to apply the law as it finds it, not to reshape the law by 
overruling precedent. See, e.g., Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930, 931-32 (E.D. 
La. 1991); K e ~ a r d  v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982). 
101. In situations like this it is "emphatically the province and duty of then 
lower federal court to try to  figure out "what the law is." Cf Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
102. See supra part I. 
103. See infia note 105 and accompanying text. 
104. E.g., Sablan Constr. Co. v. Government of Trust Territory, 526 F. Supp. 
135, 142 (D. N. Mariana Islands 1981). 
105. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE C O N ~ O N  OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 99-16, 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2117 (1988). This report and its 1988 supplement notes 190 instances in 
which the Supreme Court has overruled a previous decision. Sixty-three of the 190 
reversals (33%) did not explicitly state that they were overruling the previous case. 
Id. 2117-2'7; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE C O N S T ~ I O N  OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. DOC. NO. 100-43, 100th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 207-08 (1988 Supp.). 
106. 128 U.S. 129 (1888). In Asher, the Court found that the law and the facts 
were indistinguishable from those considered in a previous case, Robbins v. Shelby 
County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887). The petitioner contended that the deci- 
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that it may overrule its precedent by implication. 
[We had supposed that a later decision in conflict with prior 
ones had the effect to overrule [the previous ones], whether 
mentioned and commented on or not. And as to the constitu- 
tional principles involved, our views were quite fully and 
carefully, if not clearly and satisfactorily expressed in the 
[later case]. lo'
More recently, in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts 
Co.,'08 Justice Douglas, writing for a unanimous Court, re- 
ferred to Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,'" a case un- 
dermined by subsequent  opinion^,"^ as "only a relic of a by- 
gone era* and refused to follow its precedent.'" 
Another recent example of a silent or implicit reversal is 
Employment Diu ision, Department of Human Resources v. 
Smith.'12 In Smith, the Court applied rational basis scrutiny 
in place of the previous standard-strict scrutiny-and deter- 
mined that the Free Exercise Clau~e"~ did not protect reli- 
giously inspired use of peyote from state criminal sanc- 
tions.'" As the dissent noted, "In short, it effectuates a who- 
lesale overturning of settled law concerning the Religion Claus- 
es of our Con~titution.""~ Although the majority did not ex- 
pressly state that it was overruling the Court's previous Free 
sion in Robbins was "contrary to sound principles of constitutional construction, 
and in conflict with well adjudicated cases formerly decided by this court and not 
overruled." Asher, 128 U.S. at 131. 
107. Asher, 128 U.S. at 131-32. Accord Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 517-20 
(1976) (holding that Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), implicitly over- 
ruled Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 
308 (1968)). 
108. 410 U.S. 356 (1973). 
109. 277 U.S. 389 (1928). 
110. Lehnhuusen, 410 U.S. at 362. According to Justice Douglas, the cases which 
undermine &uak.er City Cab include Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940); 
Nashville, C. & St. L. R.Co. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); New York Rapid 
Transit Corp. v. City of New York, 303 U.S. 573 (1938); Carmichael v. Southern 
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937); White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 279 
U.S. 692 (1929). 
111. Lehnhausen, 410 U.S. at 365. While it is true that Quaker City Cab was 
decided in 1928, some 45 years before Lehnhausen, the fad remains that Quaker 
City Cab was never expressly overruled. The Court disregarded the case because 
its vitality had been undermined by subsequent decisions. 
112. 494 U S  872 (1990). 
113. U.S. CONSF. amend. I. 
114. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-80. 
115. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
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Exercise Clause decisions, its refusal to apply strict scrutiny 
rendered these previous decisions impotent.'16 In similar 
fashion, the Webster and Hodgson majorities' refusal to apply 
strict scrutiny undermines part of the precedentid value of 
Roe.''' 
2. Lower federal courts are not required to follow precedent 
which has been implicitly overruled 
When the Supreme Court adopts a new rule or test for 
deciding a case, that rule or test is binding on the lower 
courts.118 The Third Circuit extended this principle in Casey, 
determining that not only is a new test binding, but if the new 
test will not support the holding or  result of a previous case, 
the previous result is no longer the law.'lg This conclusion is 
not necessarily erroneous considering the importance American 
jurisprudence places on "rule stare decisi~"'~~-the consistent 
application of legal rules or tests developed in prior cases. 
a. Living v. dead law. In Norris u. United States,lzl 
Judge Posner commented that 
116. Lower federal courts now follow the precedent of Smith. See, e.g., Vandiver 
v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 931-34 (6th Cir. 1991); Yang v. 
Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (1990). 
117. But see United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 436 (1922) ("a case is not 
overruled by an omission to mention it"). The Court's statement, though facially 
inconsistent with the concept of implicit reversal, is not dispositive of the issue in 
Casey. In Moreland, the Court merely noted that the failure to cite a previous case 
did not affect the validity of its precedent. It did not address the effect subsequent 
analysis might have on the vitality of a precedent or the effect of specifically con- 
sidering a case and not applying its analysis. 
118. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 194 (1977); cfi County of Alle- 
gheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 668 (1989) (Ke~edy ,  J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
White & Scalia, JJ., dissenting) (cited in P l a ~ e d  Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 
682, 692 (3d Cir. 1991) ("As a general rule, the principle of stare decisis directs us 
to adhere not only to the holdings of our prior cases, but also to their explications 
of the governing rules of law.")). 
119. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In holding that the result of 
the older case is no longer binding, the Casey court did not mean that the result 
is wrong, rather the court reasoned that if the application of a new standard of 
review leads to a different result, the result of the old case ceases to control. See 
Casey, 947 F.2d at 698 n.12. 
120. Novak, supra note 5, at 757-58 and m.7-10. Rule stare decisis requires the 
adherence "to the general rule of law promulgated by a prior court in support of 
its judgment." Id. at 758 n.10. Arguably, result stare decisis allows a court to 
"adopt a new justifying rule so long as the result reached is consistent with the 
result in the earlier case." Id. 
121. 687 F.2d 899 (7th Cir. 1982). 
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[c]onstitutional law is very largely a prediction of how the 
Supreme Court will decide particular issues when presented 
to it for decision. . . . [Slometimes later decisions, though not 
explicitly overruling or even mentioning an earlier decision, 
indicate that the Court very probably will not decide the issue 
the same way the next time. In such a case, to continue to 
follow the earlier case blindly until it is formally overruled is 
to apply the dead, not the living, law.ln 
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
Vukasovich, Inc. v. Commissioner,'" stating: 
[Tlhe Supreme Court has long held that "a later decision in 
conflict with prior ones @as] the effect to overrule them, 
whether mentioned and commented on or not." . . . Following 
an obviously outdated Supreme Court decision gives effect to 
an old decision only at  the cost of ignoring more recent deci- 
sions. It forces the Supreme Court to reverse lower court 
decisions following the older law, burdening both the Supreme 
Court and litigants. I t  also deprives the Supreme Court of the 
benefit of a contemporary decision on the merits by the Court 
of Appeals. 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that "the courts of appeal should 
decide cases according to  their reasoned view of the way [the] 
Supreme Court would decide the pending case today."'25 
b. Detecting an implicit reversal. In United States v. 
~ u r k e , ' ~  Judge Easterbrook noted that "[a district] court 
need not blindly follow decisions that have been undercut by 
subsequent cases" if it has "an adequate basis for believing that 
this court would no longer follow [its pre~edent]."~~' Although 
122. Id. at 904. In Norris, the Seventh Circuit upheld a district court ruling that 
failure to raise a constitutional issue on a direct appeal barred its use in a section 
2255 motion despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Kaufman v. United States, 394 
U.S. 217 (1969) ("failure to raise a constitutional issue on direct appeal does not 
prevent raising it later in a section 2255 motion unless the movant was deliberate- 
ly bypassing the appellate process."). The Seventh Circuit noted that in light of 
subsequent Supreme Court opinions, Kaufman was no longer binding precedent 
even though it had not been expressly overturned. Norris, 687 F.2d a t  903-04. 
123. 790 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1986). 
124. Id. at 1416 (citations omitted). 
125. Id. 
126. 781 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1985). 
127. Id. at  1239 n.2. Judge Easterbrook's comment was prompted by a district 
court's decision not to give the "standing alone" instruction required by United 
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Burke dealt with a precedent established by the Seventh Cir- 
cuit, it is instructive in the context of Supreme Court precedent 
as well. If a lower federal court has an adequate basis for be- 
lieving that the Supreme Court will no longer follow an outdat- 
ed precedent, the lower federal court may be justified in disre- 
garding that precedent. However, in order to avoid chaos in the 
federal judicial system, an adequate basis must include, at a 
minimum, evidence that the precedential value of an older deci- 
sion has been seriously undermined. This standard for eval- 
uating the validity of an older decision was endorsed by the 
Supreme Court in Limbach u. Hooven & Allison Co.'" The 
Court stated that "[allthough Hooven I was not expressly over- 
ruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as retaining no vitality 
since the Michelin decision. The conclusion of the Supreme 
Court of Ohio that Hooven I retains current validity in this re- 
spect is therefore in error."129 
In light of the Supreme Court's analysis in Webster and 
Hodgson, the Third Circuit was justified in asserting an ade- 
quate basis for believing that the Supreme Court would not 
follow the precedent of Roe, Akron I, or Thornburgh. 
The narrowest grounds rule suffers from significant theo- 
retical inconsistencies. However, from a practical standpoint, it 
is a useful tool for lower federal courts to use in interpreting 
the precedential value of Supreme Court splintered decisions. 
Given the voting patterns of the Justices in Webster and 
Hodgson, the Casey court properly applied the narrowest 
grounds rule, resulting in a+finding that undue burden review 
is the appropriate standard for reviewing abortion regulations. 
The Casey court's decision to discard the holdings in Akron I 
and Thornburgh is facially troubling because the Supreme 
Court has not expressly repudiated them. However, the Court 
has arguably changed its standard of review for abortion regu- 
lations to undue burden review. Therefore, the Third Circuit 
appropriately discarded a result which, according to the court's 
States v. D o ~ e l l y ,  179 F.2d 227, 233 (7th Cir. 1950). Judge Easterbrook noted 
that "recent decisions . . . [had] distinguished Donnelly on such thin grounds as to 
undermine its foundations." Burke, 781 F.2d at 1239 n.2. 
128. 466 U.S. 353, 357-61 (1984). 
129. Id. at 361 (referring to Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976)). 
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analysis, would not be supported by that standard. 
Although these issues arose in the abortion context, they 
are applicable to other substantive areas of the law as well. At 
a time when the Supreme Court is modifymg many of its previ- 
ous precedents and issuing splintered decisions, lower federal 
courts will need to make use of tools such as rule stare decisis 
and the narrowest grounds rule to reach a decision which rea- 
sonably predicts how the Court would decide the case. If the 
Supreme Court objects to this type of jurisprudence, the Court 
has, indeed always has had, the mechanism to prevent it. The 
Justices of the Supreme Court can clearly state "what the law 
is." 
William G. Peterson 
